How Fairly do Chimpanzees Play the Ultimatum Game? by Proctor, Darby et al.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Psychology Faculty Publications Department of Psychology
2013





Georgia State University, sbrosnan@gsu.edu
Frans B.M. de Waal
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/psych_facpub
Part of the Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Psychology at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Proctor, D., Brosnan, S.F. & de Waal, F.B.M. (2013). How Fairly do Chimpanzees Play the Ultimatum Game? Communicative &
Integrative Biology, 6(3), e23819. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1220806110
www.landesbioscience.com Communicative & Integrative Biology e23819-1
Communicative & Integrative Biology 6:3, e23819; May/June 2013; © 2013 Landes Bioscience
 ArtICLe AddenduM ArtICLe AddenduM
Addendum to: Proctor D, et al. Proc Natl Acad 
Sci USA 2013; 110:2070-5; PMID:23319633; http://
dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1220806110.
Keywords: chimpanzee, ultimatum 





Citation: Proctor D, Brosnan SF, de Waal FBM. How 
fairly do chimpanzees play the ultimatum game? 
Commun Integr Biol 2013; 6: e23819
*Correspondence to: Darby Proctor; 
Email: dprocto@emory.edu
Humans can behave fairly, but can other species? Recently we tested 
chimpanzees on a classic human test 
for fairness, the Ultimatum Game, and 
found that they behaved similarly to 
humans. In humans, Ultimatum Game 
behavior is cited as evidence for a human 
sense of fairness. By that same logic, we 
concluded that chimpanzees behaved 
fairly in our recent study. However, we 
make a distinction between behavior and 
motivation. Both humans and chimpan-
zees behaved fairly, but determining why 
they did so is more challenging.
We recently played the Ultimatum Game 
(UG) with chimpanzees and found that 
the apes showed very similar responses 
to those shown by adult humans in pre-
vious studies, and indeed also responded 
very much like the young children tested 
with almost exactly the same paradigm 
in our own study. Our conclusion that 
this hints at fairness in the apes caused 
debate, with some arguing that a prefer-
ence for fairness requires the rejection 
of unfairness (in this case, a rejection of 
the unfair offer). Without the latter, our 
critics said, the former cannot be consid-
ered demonstrated. This is, however, not 
a typical criterion used in human studies. 
The obvious issue is that all we can do is 
measure choices that are made. What is 
behind those choices is a separate ques-
tion. Motivations for fair outcomes are 
open to interpretation, in humans as well 
as other species.
The UG, developed in economics, 
is a two-player game in which the first 
player, or Proposer, is given some amount 
of money that he/she can split with the 
second player, the Respondent, in any 
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way. If the Respondent accepts the offer, 
then both players leave with the proposed 
split. However, if the Respondent rejects 
the offer, neither player is rewarded. In 
humans, responses to the UG vary by cul-
ture,1 but in most populations the major-
ity of offers fall between 40–50% with a 
50% split being the most frequent offer.2-4 
Thus, human behavior in this task is said 
to be “fair” as rewards are often distributed 
equitably between the partners. However, 
in a similar economic task, the Dictator 
Game (DG), in which Respondents can-
not refuse offers, humans are more selfish 
than they are in UGs,3,4 offering ~23% 
of the money.5 Here, we discuss the com-
ponents of UGs that are indicative of fair 
behavior and discuss this in light our 
recent findings.
From the Proposer’s perspective in 
UGs, there seem to be two motivations, 
which may operate independently or in 
concert, for making equitable offers. First, 
Proposers could be acting out of self-inter-
est.3,6 That is, by making equitable offers 
they hope to ensure their offer will be 
accepted and thus avoid the possibility of 
receiving nothing (should the Responder 
reject the offer). However, it is also possi-
ble that Proposers act out of some altruis-
tic urge, which makes them act generously 
or fairly toward their partner.3,5,7 These 
motivations, which cannot be deduced 
from the actual choices, cannot be eluci-
dated without explicitly asking the partici-
pants. However, self-reported motivations 
are notoriously inaccurate even with 
objectively measurable phenomenon, such 
as height.8 Most of the human UGs report 
behavioral measures only, therefore, i.e., 
whether the behavior of the Proposer was 
fair or not.
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showed behaviors, such as spitting water 
at proposers or hitting the barrier between 
them, which indicated dissatisfaction with 
selfish offers. Similarly, the young chil-
dren also never rejected offers but would 
make statements such as “I want more.” 
None of these types of behaviors were 
directed toward the experimenter, indicat-
ing that both chimpanzees and children 
regarded the Proposer as the main agent. 
These observations are in sharp contrast 
to previous attempts to play the UG with 
apes,11 in which the apes were not required 
to interact with each other, and indeed 
never did.12
Proposers behaved fairly, therefore. 
But, does the absence of rejections by 
Respondents suggest that they were indif-
ferent to fair outcomes? We do not believe 
so. The communicative interactions that 
we observed among the children and 
chimpanzees suggest a preference for fair 
behavior, even if this preference never 
translated into rejections. However, we 
should note that fairness is likely not the 
only motivation at work here. If it were, 
both humans and chimpanzees would 
also play fairly in DGs, but they do not.5,9 
Given the similarities in behavioral out-
comes between humans and apes, our 
working hypothesis is similarity in moti-
vation even though this is an area in which 
we need more research on both humans 
and other animals.13
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In the chimpanzee version of this 
game,9 we limited the offers to two pos-
sibilities. Proposers could either make an 
equitable offer that rewarded both chim-
panzees equally, or a selfish offer favor-
ing the Proposer him/herself. We found 
that in 72% of trials Proposers made 
equitable offers, a percentage very simi-
lar to humans that make equitable offers 
(76%).7 Is this fair behavior? We believe 
so. For some reason the Proposers were 
motivated to achieve the same outcome as 
the one called “fair” in humans.
But what about Respondents? In that 
same 72% of trials there were no rejec-
tions, as there should be no reason to 
reject fair offers. In the remaining 28% 
of trials, we also did not see rejections, 
which is potentially more difficult to 
explain: aren’t Respondents supposed to 
reject unfair behavior? In typical human 
studies, this is the case, but these stud-
ies differ from ours in two important 
respects. First, humans are explicitly told 
that refusing is an option. In our case, we 
could not give chimpanzees these instruc-
tions, so we withheld them from the chil-
dren as well. Refusals would have had to 
be spontaneous. Second, and most impor-
tantly, in typical human studies, refusal is 
the only way to respond to the Proposer. 
Proposers and Responders typically inter-
act in a one-shot, anonymous interaction 
with a stranger, leaving the Responder 
no other recourse. In our study, how-
ever, much as in real life, Responders 
and Proposers were members of the same 
social group, and had opportunities to 
interact in ways other than rejection. In 
humans, even the opportunity to write a 
note to the Proposer reduces the rate of 
rejections.10 In our study, Respondents 
